By: Muhammad Dhahir Watr
The [Army] Staff Headquarters was responsible for organizing the affairs pertaining to recruitment of soldiers and encouraging them [to join the army], as well as personal matters [of the individual soldiers] like strengthening the spirit of the combatants etc. The following departments fell under their command:


1. The Department Of Planning And Scheduling:

This is the department that is responsible for:

a) Planning the overall policy

b) Drawing out maps for war

c) Finding out the number of combatants in the army (and)

d) Their weaponry

e) Instituting regulations and rules of military service

f) Preparing the senior commanders

g) Establishing the procedure of selection[590]

Now we will explain each of the above in turn.


a) Planning the policy for the participation of the Ansa-r in battle

The Ansa-r were obliged by their agreement in the Pledge of ‘Aqaba to protect the Holy Prophet (s) inside Madina.[591] This had made the Quraysh angry and infuriated them so they began making preparations quickly to wage war on those who had granted refuge to and helped the Muha-jirin.[592] In the beginning, the Muha-jirin took up the flag of charge and attack on their shoulders[593] and carried out the first military mission without the participation of a single person from the Ansa-r, under the command of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Master of the Martyrs (‘a),[594] and in this way numerous consecutive missions and minor battles were fought by the Muha-jirin themselves until the Battle of Badr.[595]

After the Prophet (s) informed the Ansa-r about the threat that they were all faced with, he sought their view about participation in war and assisting him inside and outside Madina. The Ansa-r were ready to cooperate and participate in battle and expressed their decision to fight alongside the Muha-jirin with their own volition. In this way, they diverted from the Pledge of ‘Aqabah and the allegiance of Wa-di Dhafara-n[596] and participated in the Battle of Badr and other battles alongside the Muha-jirin.[597] From this time onwards, the Muslim army consisted of these two groups.


b) Methods of Negotiation

Negotiations with the enemy after the end of battle and the agreement that was reached between the two parties was, depending on the circumstances, conducted by the supreme commander (s) who would take full control.[598] When the Jews sought negotiations, he (s) dealt harshly with them, to such an extent that he banished some of them from their lands[599] and after disarming them, he let their wives and children go,[600] however he ordered the killing of some others who has broken their covenant and had cooperated with the enemy.[601]

The Prophet (s) displayed forbearance and leniency with the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya.[602] He accepted their conditions and even accepted some of the conditions that his companions and commanders deemed to be against the interest of the Muslims,[603] and went ahead to sign the treaty.[604] In this way and in order to attain the actual goals, the Prophet (s) would obtain victory through harsh measures at certain times and through leniency and tolerance in other situations.[605]


c) Designing a Program in order to Know the Enemy

The Prophet (s) would, at the outset, study the enemy and ways of countering them. The Quraysh were people who had forced him to leave his home and were determined to fight against him uncompromisingly.[606] The Prophet (s) also began preparing forces and weapons in order to counter them[607] and faced them in a number of battles,[608] and in the end he eventually gained victory and they submitted to his wishes.

However, with regards to the Jews, when they showed their enmity by breaking the covenant [they had made with him][609] and took up arms against him, he was forced to fight them or banish them from their lands.[610] It was at this time [and for this reason] that the first battle against them took place.

With regards to the other Arab tribes, however, he only entered into battle against them when they were the instigators[611] or when they attempted to wage war against Madina and invade it with their armies.[612] Taking this into consideration, he only faced the enemy tribes and dealt with them the way they deserved to be dealt with.[613]

As for Rome, he (s) saw it as a grave threat in the way of the Isla-mic Revolution, especially since they possessed vast resources and had a lot of political influence in the Arabian provinces.[614] Despite this, the Prophet (s) delayed military action against them until an appropriate time and enough preparations had been made to come face to face with the Roman army. For this reason, he did not enter into intense and decisive battles with them as he had done with his previous enemies [i.e. the Quraysh and the Jews], rather he launched minor assaults on them[615] and, in order to develop the Muslim army and increase their military might, he embarked on small battles with them.


d) Creating a Plan to Gain Control of the Most Important Routes and Courses

The most important routes and courses that the Holy Prophet (s) studied and planned on controlling were the ‘coastal routes'[616] which would be a sure means of cutting off the primary reinforcements of the enemy, and he was successful in doing this.[617] Then he turned his attention to the ‘eastern route'[618] that the Quraysh had begun using after the first route was blocked, and by taking control of this route also, he completed his siege of the enemy from all the directions. The Prophet (s) was victorious in all the battles that were subsequently fought in order to regain control of these routes.[619]

In the same way, the supreme commander successfully planned and took control of the ‘northern route’ of Arabian Peninsula – in the border of Syria[620] – and of Dumat al-Jundal,[621] because of their strategic locations militarily, politically and economically, for the war with the Romans.[622]


e) Appointing a Deputy in Madina

Whenever the Holy Prophet (s) went for any battle, he would always appoint a deputy and representative in Madina,[623] and he would change the appointee from battle to battle.[624] Sometimes two representatives would be selected[625] and each one of them would be given specific tasks. The functions of the Prophet’s deputy would normally consist of leading the congregational prayers for those who remained behind and did not participate in battle for some valid excuse,[626] and protecting and safeguarding the status and respect of the members of the household of the Holy Prophet (s).[627] After the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet (s) also appointed a deputy to manage the important affairs of that city.[628]


f) Reviewing of the Supreme Commander of the Army

The supreme commander would review the ‘mobilization and stationing’ of the army.[629] He would inspect the army[630] and arrange it for marching or battle. He studied their capability for war,[631] sent back the sick, young and weak,[632] lifted the spirits of those who fought in battle[633] and gave the necessary orders and instructions to the commanders (of the army).[634] If he sent them for a Sariya or a mission, like the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahma-n ibn ‘Auf to Dumat al-Jundal, and his sending of Zayd bin Haritha for war with the Romans [in the Battle of Muta], he would personally bid them farewell and pray for their success.[635] When the army was getting organized, he would join them and take over the command himself.[636]

The Prophet (s) would organize and arrange the forces for parades and processions, just as he had done before the Conquest of Makkah and during their entry into the city. In this organization, the ‘cavaliers’ would be in the fore and were made up of three groups. Then followed the units of the Muha-jirin and Ansa-r and then came the units of the Ghaffa-r, Aslam, Bani ‘Umar, Bani Ka’b, Mazinah, Jahinah and Bani Hamzah. Is was after this that the Green Column was positioned.[637]

The manner of stationing of the forces was in such a way that the Bani Saleem were in front, the Jahinah were in the middle and the Green Column was placed at the back.[638] The course of the army’s movement with this arrangement[639] in front of Abu Sufya-n and other observers and the station of the supreme commander – which was located in the Green Column – was determined and the soldiers marched in front of them in this order.[640]

The carrying of flags[641] was in such a way that in every contingent and unit, a number of flags were hoisted and the main banner was with ‘Ali bin Abi Ta-lib (‘a) at the central command post in the last unit. The parade and procession of the army was conducted in full military attire[642] in such a way that from the Green Column, nothing but the pupil of their eyes could be seen. The vanguard and the cavaliers marched in front.[643] The Banu Saleem were in the front-line with one thousand horsemen and the commander of the paraded columns was selected by the supreme commander.[644] Kha-lid bin Walid was chosen as the commander of three columns of the vanguard:

First: The column under the command of ‘Abba-s bin Marada-s al-Salami

Second: The column under the command of Khafa-f ibn Nudbah

Third: The column under the command of Hajja-j ibn ‘Ala-t

Then Zubayr ibn ‘Awa-m was appointed as the commander of the column of the Muha-jirin and Ansa-r and Abu Dharr al-Ghaffa-ri was made in charge of the column of the tribe of Ghaffa-r and others.


g) Placing the Capable Individuals in Appropriate Positions

Military skills and expertise in the Muslim army were numerous and varied,[645] like intelligence, combat on horseback, fighting on foot, archery etc. In order to assign posts for every responsibility conditions were placed that were different for every individual. The Holy Prophet (s) would assign the task of intelligence operations[646] to such an individual in whom the ability of protecting and hiding secrets was strong, who was well informed, trustworthy, patient and forbearing in [times of] pain, hunger and thirst, like ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, Habba-b ibn Mundhir, Zubayr ibn ‘Awa-m, Hudhayfa ibn al-Yama-n and others.

In the same way, he would appoint a commander of a contingent[647] who was aware about the topography of the land and the enemy that he would face, like Zayd ibn Ha-ritha, ‘Amr ibn ‘Aa-s, Kha-lid ibn Walid and others.

As for the flag-bearer,[648] a steadfast and courageous person was chosen such as ‘Ali ibn Abi Ta-lib, Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib and Mus’ab ibn ‘Umayr. From the archers[649] also, someone highly skilled like Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqa-s was selected. The [head] swordsman[650] was someone who used his sword well in the thick of war. The [head] horseman[651] was one who fought steadily and unfalteringly on the horse, like Kha-lid bin Walid.

These individuals and others would be given charge of these responsibilities without any regard for their relationship[652] [to the Prophet (s)]. The supreme commander chose Zayd ibn Ha-ritha as the first commander of the army, whereas he made Ja’far bin Abi Ta-lib, who was a close relative of his, second in command. Sometimes the selection was not based solely on his past [military] record,[653] because the Prophet (s) appointed Usa-ma bin Zayd, a young commander, as the leader of the army that was sent to Abna-m and some of the other great commanders were placed under his command.[654]

Similarly, one’s previous record [with regards to accepting Isla-m] was not a consideration;[655] because ‘Amr ibn ‘Aa-s was given the charge of a Sariya mission in which great companions like Abu ‘Ubayda ibn Jarra-h and other great commanders participated, while it had only been a few months since ‘Amr ibn ‘Aa-s had accepted Isla-m.[656] Similarly, the rank and status of a person[657] was not a criterion for being appointed a commander. The Holy Prophet (s) made Abu Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Asad Makhzumi the commander of a Sariya mission wherein others who [according of their rank and status] were more deserving, were present.[658]


h) Preserving the Unity and Integration of the Army

The supreme commander forbade disputes and quarrels among the members of the army. He established friendship and camaraderie among them and made them like a single body.[659] The Prophet (s) prevented the killing of the known hypocrite ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay and instructed that he should be dealt with kindly.[660] In this way, he (s) was able to quell the disturbance that was about to obliterate the unity and harmony of the Muslim army after the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq[661] because of a verbal confrontation between the Muha-jirin and Ansa-r.[662]

Similarly, the Holy Prophet (s), in another instance, forgave the lapse of Abu Luba-ba when he took the wrong course in consultation with the Bani Quraydha.[663]

He forgave Ha-tib bin Abi Balta’ah for his a mistake when sending letters to the enemy before the Conquest of Makkah[664] and this was because of his illustrious track record in the Muslim army. He (s) also ordered Abu ‘Ubayda ibn Jarra-h to cooperate with ‘Amr ibn ‘Aa-s [who as the commander of the army in Dha-t al-Sala-sil] in order to preserve unity.

The Prophet (s) also took it upon himself to ‘refine and purify the souls’ of the Ansa-r, who constituted a large part of the army. He did this during the distribution of the booty of Hunayn when he saw[665] anger and rage on their faces.[666] In the same way, he instilled affection and brotherhood in their hearts[667] and in the end he would be pleased with all the good qualities and merits of his armed forces.[668] It is for this very reason that the politics of ‘wisdom and planning’, ‘far-sightedness and judging the character of the army soldiers’, ‘giving greater importance to expediency’, ‘ending quarrels and arguments that lead to listlessness and defeat, before they spread through and pervade the army’, were required.


i) Discipline

‘Discipline’ was the honest and sincere execution of the commands that were issued by the supreme commander in order to achieve the aimed objectives.[669] Discipline in the Muslim army was centered around the belief in God, the Prophet,[670] his evenhandedness,[671] and unconditional loyalty to one commander.[672] Among the most important foundations of discipline was the complete obedience in difficulty and ease, war and peace, likes and dislikes.[673]

The most evident signs of this were: ‘absolute obedience’,[674] ‘contentment’,[675] ‘acceptance of responsibility’,[676] ‘the strength to come face to face with dangers’,[677] ‘acting with one’s own volition’,[678] ‘innovation by the executors’,[679] ‘the profundity of the meaning of discipline and its practice by the commander himself (as well)’ and ‘his method and ability in action’, which he would strive in for the attainment of the required goal.[680]

Discipline in the Muslim army meant that following the commander and emulating him was compulsory for the executive officers.[681] It was never permitted, under any circumstances, for them to act on their whims, without thinking, with complete ignorance or rigidity.[682] Rather they were bound by the spirit of obedience and doing that which was necessary and what they were able to in order to realize the goal.[683]

The strength of discipline was clearly seen in the Battle of Hamra- al-Asad, when the order was given for the enemy to be pursued, before returning to Madina, [immediately] after the Battle of Uhud. At this time, despite the fact that the soldiers were tired and wounded as a result of war, and were mourning their martyrs, they still all obeyed the order and none of them contravened the command of facing the enemy.[684] Similarly, the affection for the commander and belief in him made the army submit to [what were perceived as] the harsh and unpalatable conditions of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya.[685]

An example of the belief in the evenhandedness of the commander in his orders was that he compelled ‘Abdullah ibn Rawa-ha to enforce discipline when he gave him instructions during the fight against the Romans in the Battle of Muta.[686] The supreme commander would warn against lack of discipline which would lead to listlessness, defeat and hardship in the battlefield.[687]


j) Determining the Number of Soldiers in the Army

In the first Sariya that the Holy Prophet (s) sent to fight against the enemy, he started by be sending thirty fighters[688] and in the second Sariya, he increased the number to eighty.[689] With the passing of time and the sending of more groups and missions, this number increased, until the Battle of Badr where it reached three hundred and thirteen[690] and in the last battle that was fought, there were over thirty thousand [Muslim] soldiers.[691]

In the beginning, the organization of the army was limited to the Muha-jirin,[692] but after some time, the Ansa-r[693] and eventually a number of other Arab tribes joined the army.[694] The most important of these were: Muzayna, Aslam, Juhayna, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ghifa-r, Kina-na, Ashja’ and Banu Layth.

Women also constituted a small part of the armed forces and would help in the treating the wounded and providing assistance to the soldiers.[695] The supreme commander would endeavor to promote the growth and expansion of this army, and for this very reason, he would protect the soldiers – meaning that he would not send them towards their death or destruction – to such an extent that the total number of martyrs in all the nine years under his command did not exceed three hundred and seventeen.[696] This number is divided as follows: Badr – 14 martyrs, Uhud – 70 martyrs, Bi’r Ma’unah[697] – 70 martyrs, al-Rajee’ – 10 martyrs, Khandaq – 6 martyrs, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslama against the Bani Tha’laba – 10 martyrs, Bani al-Mustalaq – one martyr, Khaybar – 15 to 19 martyrs, the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa’d al-Ansa-ri towards the Bani Murrah – 30 martyrs, the Sariya of Abi al-‘Awja-‘ al-Sulami towards the Bani Saleem – 50 martyrs, Ka’b ibn ‘Umayr al-Ghifa-ri to the Bani Qudha-‘ah – 15 martyrs, the Battle of Muta – 8 martyrs, the Conquest of Makkah – 2 martyrs, Hunayn – 4 martyrs and Ta-‘if – 12 martyrs.

The people, from the time they accepted Isla-m, displayed their courage in joining this army and would try to outdo each other.[698] The Prophet (s) would not send the entire army against the enemy, rather he selected an appropriate number to [send in] each battle depending on the available resources and the number of soldiers in the enemy’s army.[699] For example, he entered the battle against the Bani Saleem with a section of the forces[700] and the battle of Dhi Amr with a larger number of forces.[701] In the Battle of Tabuk and some other battles, he brought the entire army to fight.[702] Based on this, one of the most fundamental principles of war, meaning ‘economizing with the forces’, was always taken into consideration by the Prophet (s).[703]


k) Organization and arrangement of the troops

Organization included the division of the troops into units [and contingents], outlining the hierarchy of command, type of battle, where it will be fought, the army’s military might, the enemy’s strengths and weaponry, and the modes of transport used by both sides.[704] The Prophet’s goal from this organization was facilitating ease of command and control over the troops during the battle, motivation and stabilization.[705]

It was for this reason that he put different units under the command of one person[706] and put different types of weapons at their disposal.[707] This is precisely what he did in the Conquest of Makkah where he rearranged the tribes according to the prevailing conditions.[708]

In the battle of the Conquest, he arranged the Muha-jirs into three columns consisting of two hundred soldiers each, the Aus into six columns of 350 soldiers and the tribe of Aslam into one column consisting of two hundred fighters, and he did the same with different groups and new contingents,[709] just as he had arranged the column of archers in the Battle of Uhud.

The Prophet (s) would at times arrange the army based on ‘new battle equipment’,[710] this is why the arrangement of the army in the Conquest of Makkah was very different from the arrangement of the army in the Battle of Hunayn. He (s) would bring together various distinct qualities and talents during the formation of each contingent in order to make them able to fight independently;[711] like the groups of four who entered Makkah. The Prophet organized the troops in pyramidal forms in a single group and in groups of two, three and four depending on the number of tribes.

The single pyramidal contingent was led by Abu Wa-qid al-Laythi and was made up from the tribes of Kana-nah, Bani Hamzah, Bani Layth and Sa’d bin Bakr. The group of twos were made up of troops from the tribe of Ashja’ and the groups of three consisted of members from the tribe of Muzaynah while the groups of four were from the tribe of Juhaynah. This formation made it easier to attain the best speed and movement during battle.[712] In the present day and age also, armed forces are organized into pyramidal groups of three and four.[713]

The organization for battle was different from the arrangement of troops who were marched in front of Abu Sufya-n before the Conquest of Makkah. The Holy Prophet (s) would try to give the command of an entire column to the leader of the tribe whose troops were present in that column.[714] Whenever the numbers of the tribe did not match with the column, he would include other groups in it and would select a commander from a tribe that was present in that column.[715]


2. The Administrative Council

The Administrative Council was a body whose responsibility was to advise the supreme commander about all affairs related to the military. This council consisted of military commanders from the Muha-jirs, the Ansa-rs and other tribes.[716] The Holy Prophet (s) always consulted with this council about issues related to war and he would take the opinion of its members about the following matters:

a) Declaring war on the enemy

b) Benefitting from the participation of the Ansa-r (in battle)

c) Centralization of the troops like in the Battle of Badr[717]

d) Remaining in Madina or coming out to face the Quraysh in the Battle of Uhud[718]

e) Digging the ditch in the Battle of Ahza-b

f) Creating a peace treaty with the Ghatfa-n for one third of the dates of Madina[719]

g) Whether to make peace or war in the expedition of Hudaybiyya[720]

h) The fixity and change of command in the Battle of Khaybar[721]

i) Whether to remain steadfast or move and launch an attack on the Roman empire

j) Return to Madina[722]

k) The battle between the Roman army and the troops of Zayd bin Ha-ritha where, when consulted, most of the commanders, and especially ‘Abdullah bin Rawa-hah, the deputy commander, gave the opinion that they should fight against the Romans[723]

After studying the progress of the various battles it must be said that the situation would be different from place to place and in different military zones, and the study and deliberation about this issue can be considered clear evidence of the aptitude and soundness of opinion of the Holy Prophet (s) in these matters.[724]

In this council, the Prophet (s) had one vote just like the other members and he would listen carefully to the opinions and views of the other members. For the Battle of Uhud,[725] due to the fact that the majority had given the opinion that they should come out of Madina, even though he himself thought it would be more prudent to remain in the city, he supported the view of the council.[726] This was the beginning of ‘democracy’, something that most of the countries in today’s world are calling for.

The Holy Prophet (s) would refrain from imposing his opinions and insisting on his views.[727] Therefore, he would respect the commanders and sit with them and take their advice on various issues, just as he accepted the advice of Haba-b bin Mundhir, Salma-n al-Fa-rsi, Sa’d bin Mu’a-dh, Sa’d bin ‘Uba-dah and ‘Umar bin Khatta-b in different situations in battle.[728] He would always show tolerance and leniency to those who offered advice and would respect their views. He would never accuse them of being ignorant.

With his kind words and clear statements,[729] he would assist them to remain free of pretence and flattery[730] and to acquire good characters and remain truthful.[731] In the end, after listening to the advice, he would issue his orders. Because he was determined to carry out the decision of the council,[732] nobody would dare to oppose the orders he gave.[733] Members of the council were attributed with higher intelligence, prudent judgment and a greater awareness and understanding of military affairs, and were deemed trustworthy and reliable by the supreme commander.[734]

One of the most important results of forming an administrative council was that the experience of war which was the cause of the Muslim army’s victory were revealed, the morals and characters of the participants were improved and strong bonds of friendship between them were formed. At the same time the full responsibility and accountability fell on their shoulders[735] and any matter that was put before the administrative council was discussed and debated by its members, the pros and cons were highlighted[736] and an appropriate conclusion was drawn.[737]

The Holy Prophet (s) would request the views of the council in matters such as warfare,[738] selecting a representative[739] and deputy[740] and other matters, and he would stress on the important role played by its members in leadership, because if they were suitable then the commander would also be good[741] otherwise the leadership will be corrupted and they will lead the commander to destruction and will act as hindrances and impediments in his path. The commanders who came after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (s) would also seek advice from the trustworthy leaders of the army.[742] ‘Umar bin al-Khatta-b gave more importance to this than anyone else,[743] to such an extent that he would also listen to the advice of children.


3. The Department Of Doctrinal Guidance

This department was responsible for ‘the spiritual and doctrinal development of the troops, its preservation and strengthening and at the same time, for weakening the morale of the enemy and destroying it’, and was divided into various sections, each carrying out specific functions that were different from state to state, but overall it had a common spiritual goal that it tries to fulfill.[744]

The Prophet (s) would continuously strengthen the morale of the army[745] using various means, the most important of which included: training and continuous guidance of the troops,[746] putting the supreme commander (i.e. himself) at the same level as the soldiers,[747] sharing in their sorrows[748] and happiness,[749] defending the soldiers, steadfastness in battles,[750] [fair] distribution of war booty,[751] upgrading the weapons and equipment used by the troops in battle,[752] caring for the families of those who were martyred,[753] carrying out training for different battle strategies[754] so as to break down the wall of fear among the troops, and bringing them face to face with the different battle scenarios.[755]

The Holy Prophet (s) also used various techniques to maintain this spirit, the most important among which were: expulsion of weak soldiers and those who have been defeated [spiritually] from among the troops,[756] wiping out false rumours,[757] hiding information that could weaken the spirit and resolve of the people,[758] habituating the forces to adherence to strict discipline at all times[759] and creating a bond of mutual trust and friendship between the commander and his troops.[760]

An example of the strength in spirit was the presence and participation of some fighters in the army to face the enemy without any weapons whatsoever,[761] some would come to fight despite being young in age,[762] and another group would be ready to face hoards of enemy soldiers despite their few numbers.[763] Others would pull their horses behind them and would continue doing so throughout the battle.[764] Yet others would make it their mission to assassinate those who had said or done anything against the supreme commander and who had ill will against the Isla-mic revolution.[765]

He (s) would instill faith and belief in the Muslim army in such a way that their spirit would never wane and would provide them the energy and strength to carry out all the missions that required self-sacrifice and struggle.[766] The distinguishing feature that impelled the soldiers to strong spirituality[767] was the hope in the life hereafter and [the fact that] they were faced with two options which both led to success, either victory with honor or martyrdom and entrance into everlasting bliss.[768] In this way, the father and son would keep their relationship aside and would strive to surpass one another in the hope of paradise.[769]

In the Battle of Uhud, despite the rumour that the Prophet (s) had been killed, they continued to fight bravely. And this bravery was a testament to their strong faith and conviction.[770] Some of the forces would [try to] outdo each other in fighting for the supreme commander and would even kill their own relatives in defense of their faith.[771] Khubayb bin. ‘Uday when forced to return to his previous faith preferred death.[772] Therefore the spirit in the Muslim army was aimed at protecting the faith and it was one of the most important goals of the Prophet (s) to strengthen this very spirit.

The supreme commander would also, on the other side try to weaken the spirit and resolve of the enemy, causing them to waver, and instill fear and terror in their hearts[773] to such an extent that they were not capable of coming out to fight against him. The most important ways in which he accomplished this included: displaying their strength and might,[774] using intelligence agents, taking precaution in employing counter-intelligence measures[775] and scrutinizing them,[776] arresting enemy spies,[777] carrying out attacks using offensive strategies[778] especially in the battles of Bani Quraydha and Khaybar and some of the Sariya missions like the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, and that of ‘Amr bin ‘Aa-s against the Qudha-‘ah, all of which were missions in which swift attacks were used. This was similarly the case, the attacks against the tribe of Bani Maha-rib and Bani Tha’labah in the Battle of Sha-t al-Ruqa-‘.

Another way was by propagation of the renown and reputation of the leadership and bravery of Muslim army,[779] especially in the battle against the Bani Nadhir which was the cause of the Jews destroying their homes and strongholds by their own hands. In the battle against the Bani Lihya-n, when the enemy heard that the Holy Prophet (s) had set out [with his army] to wage war against them, they fled, as did the Banu Sa’d when they got the information that ‘Ali bin Abi Ta-lib (‘a) had started marching towards them. Similarly, being quick in defense and repulsion of any incursion by enemy forces,[780] especially in the Battle of Badr al-Kubra- and al-Gha-bah, was another of the Prophet’s tactics for weakening the resolve of the enemy.

The Holy Prophet (s) would awaken and enliven the spirit of the troops before the commencement of battle in order to attain the highest level of commitment and zeal[781] and would always try to preserve this throughout the war while removing anything that could cause a weakening in their spirits.[782] Whenever the soldiers started feeling disheartened, the Prophet (s) would strive to lift their spirits. This can be seen in the Battle of Ahza-b when the Bani Quraydha broke their covenant with the Muslims, where after the siege was taking its toll, he utilized clever trickery to cause disharmony in the ranks of the enemy’s army thereby lifting the spirits of his own troops.[783]

The spirit and zeal of the Muslim fighters would increase and decrease in accordance with the varying situations in every battle, but on the whole, the Muslim army would be in high spirits until the final stages of the battles, and in order to achieve victory, they would remain steadfast and ready to attack,[784] even in situations where they had faced shocking events, the army would come out with their heads held high and would carry through till the end. The Battles of Uhud and Khandaq were two examples of this, because the Prophet (s) lifted the spirits of the army after the Battle of Uhud by initiating the Battle of Hamra- al-Asad and during the Battle of Khandaq by causing disharmony and division in the ranks of the enemy. As a result, the confederates lost the victory and had to turn back humiliated.


[590] Wa-qidi 1:98; Ibn Hisha-m 2:266; Ibn Hazm: 208; Haydara-badi: 15-21

[591] Ibn Sa’d 1:1l Tabari 2:255; Because they had made a pact to protect the Holy Prophet (s) inside Madina, the Ansa-r did not participate in the first battle against the disbelievers. (Tr.)

[592] Q8:74

[593] Wa-qidi 1:10, Ibn Hisha-m 2:241, Ibn Sa’d 2:1-5; Tabari 2:259

[594] Ibn Hisha-m 2:245; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:224

[595] Wa-qidi 1:48; Ibn Hisha-m 2:266; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtisa-r al-Magha-zi wal-Siyar: 121 onwards

[596] Wa-qidi 1:48; Ibn Hisha-m 2:266; Ibn Sa’d 2:8; Bakri, Mu’jam Mastu’jam 2:613; Ya-qut Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Bulda-n 3:6

[597] Wa-qidi 1:23; Ibn Hisha-m 2:333; Ibn Sa’d 2:13; Tabari 2:552; Kala-‘i 1:136

[598] Wa-qidi 1:177, 2:501; Ibn Hisha-m 3:201; Ibn Sa’d 2:19; Tabari 2:552; Kala-‘i 1:134

[599] Wa-qidi 1:374; Ibn Hisha-m 3:200; Ibn Sa’d 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 154, 182. After the victory over the Bani Nadhir, the Prophet (s) left it to the Khazraj, who had a covenant with them, to decide what should be done to them. The Khazraj decided that they should be banished from their land but their women and children should be released. (Tr.)

[600] Wa-qidi 1:80; Ibn Hisha-m 3:210; Ibn Sa’d 2:19

[601] Wa-qidi 2:517; Ibn Hisha-m 3:251; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Tabari 2:588. After defeating the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (s) left it upon the Aus, who had a covenant with them, to decide their punishment. The chief of the Aus, Sa’d ibn Ma’a-dh, decided that their men should be put to death for their treason and their families and wealth should be taken. (Tr.)

[602] Zuhri: 54; Ibn Hisha-m 3:325; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:116

[603] Zuhri: 55; Ibn Sa’d 2:76; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:114. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya where Suhayl ibn ‘Amr was appointed as the representative of the Quraysh, there were many conditions that were made which the Muslims found to be one-sided and unfair, however, the Prophet (s) gave in to their demands because he knew that it was in the interest of the Muslims to do so. (Refer to Biha-r al-Anwa-r 20:335)

[604] Zuhri: 52; Ibn Sa’d 2:77; Kala-‘i 1:130

[605] Wa-qidi 1:76, 2:496; Ibn Hisha-m 3:50; Ibn Sa’d 2:19; Tabari 2:479, 3:9; Kala-‘i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:294

[606] Zuhri: 50; Wa-qidi 2:571;Ibn Hisha-m 3:321; Ibn Sa’d 2:69; Ibn Khayya-t 1:48; Tabari 2:620; Kala-‘i 1:127; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:113

[607] Ibn Hisha-m 1:281; Ibn Sa’d 1:134; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:102; Dhahabi 1:91, 168

[608] Zuhri: 76; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:225, 2:106

[609] Wa-qidi 1:176, 2:510; Ibn Sa’d 2:77; Tabari 2:552; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:48

[610] Wa-qidi 1:176; Ibn Hisha-m 3:50; Ibn Sa’d 2:19; Ibn Khayya-t 1:27; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:294; Atanin Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah (s): 277

[611] Wa-qidi 1:404; Ibn Hisha-m 3:302; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 62, 117; Razqa-ni, Sharh al-Mawa-hib 2:166

[612] Wa-qidi 2:562; Ibn Hisha-m 3:213; Ibn Sa’d 2:65; Kala-‘i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:109

[613] Wa-qidi 1:395; Ibn Sa’d 2:43; Tabari 3:27; Kala-‘i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:83

[614] Tabari 2:6 onwards; Mas’udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 1:215; Jawa-d ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi Ta-rikh al-‘Arab qabl al-Isla-m 2:635

[615] See Wa-qidi 1:402, 2:755, 3:989; Ibn Hisha-m 3:244, 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:44, 92, 118, 136; Ibn Hazm: 184

[616] Wa-qidi 1:11; Ibn Hisha-m 2:245, 251; Ibn Sa’d 2:1; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:226

[617] Wa-qidi 1:10, 13; Ibn Hisha-m 2:245; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:225

[618] Wa-qidi 1:182, 197; Tabari 2:492; Suhayli 3:142; Ya-qut Hamawi 4:212; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:305

[619] Wa-qidi 1:199, 384, 440; Ibn Hisha-m 3:64, 224; Ibn Khayya-t 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Kala-‘i 1:104, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:2, 55, 53

[620] Wa-qidi 3:990; Ibn Hisha-m 4:169; Ibn Sa’d 2:119; Bakri 1:203

[621] The Battle of Dumat al-Jundal took place in Rabi’ al-Awal, 5 A.H. and the reason for this battle was the Christian ruler of the Dumat al-Jundal (an area near Syria) called Akidar ibn ‘Abd al-Malik Kindi, who was loyal to the emperor of Rome, Heracleus. Because his land was in the center of the trade route that ran from Arabia to Syria, he would create hindrances and obstacles and would harass the Muslim travelers. When the Holy Prophet (s) heard about this, he sent a large contingent of a thousand men to Dumat al-Jundal, but by the time they got there, the people had fled and they returned without fighting. (See: Wa-qidi 1:402; Ibn Hisha-m 3:224; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:54, 108) (Tr.)

[622] Wa-qidi 1:404, 3:1026; Ibn Sa’d 2:44, 120; Suhayli 4:196, 201

[623] Wa-qidi 1:12, 2:573, 3:995; Ibn Hisha-m 2:401, 3:220, 4:32

[624] Wa-qidi 1:182; Ibn Hisha-m 3:220; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 45; Ibn Hazm: 184

[625] In the Battle of Tabuk, ‘Ali ibn Abi Ta-lib (‘a) was initially appointed as the deputy of the Prophet (s) in Madina and later Muhammad ibn Maslamah was also chosen as a representative. (See: Wa-qidi 3:1047; Ibn Hisha-m 4:162; Ibn Sa’d 4:112) (Tr.)

[626] Wa-qidi 1:277; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1198

[627] Wa-qidi 3:1047; Ibn Hisha-m 4:136; Tabari 3:104

[628] Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1023

[629] Wa-qidi 1:20, 56, 2:642, 819; Ibn Hisha-m 2:257, 3:218, 4:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:25

[630] Wa-qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hisha-m 2:257; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:121

[631] Wa-qidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa’d 2:96; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239

[632] Wa-qidi 1:20, 87; Ibn Hisha-m 2:279; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Ibn Hanbal 1:117

[633] Ibn Hisha-m 3:70; Ibn Sa’d 2:6, 27; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:257

[634] Wa-qidi 1:13, 2:560, 3:1117; Ibn Hisha-m 4:49; Ibn Sa’d 2:35, 98; Kala-‘i 1:144

[635] Wa-qidi 2:560, 755; Ibn Hisha-m 4:15; Ibn ‘Asa-kir 1:92; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:108. In some locations in Madina, meaning near the Thaniya-t, the Prophet (s) would bid farewell to the army, that is why these places would be known as Thaniya-t al-Wada-‘ and the Prophet would come to these places in order to bid farewell to the army and welcome them back. (Tr.)

[636] Zuhri: 86, 92; Ibn Sa’d 2:96, 108; Ibn Khayya-t 1:56

[637] Wa-qidi 2:819; Ibn Hisha-m 4:46

[638] Wa-qidi 2:819; Ibn Hisha-m 4:46

[639] Wa-qidi 2:823

[640] Wa-qidi 2:819; Ibn Hisha-m 6:46. One of the examples of the psychological war of the Prophet (s) was that he paraded his troops in front of Abu Sufyan and when the latter saw the strength of the Muslim army, he realized that they would not be able to fight them. Thus he was left with no choice but to submit and it was at this point that he accepted Isla-m. (Tr.)

[641] Wa-qidi 2:819 onwards

[642] Wa-qidi 2:821; Ibn Hisha-m 4:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Tabari 3:54

[643] Wa-qidi 2:819

[644] Wa-qidi 2:819; Ibn Hisha-m 4:46, 47

[645] Wa-qidi 1:218, 2:457; Ibn Hisha-m 2:278; Ibn Sa’d 2:45; Ibn Hanbal 5:420; Tabari 2:446

[646] Wa-qidi 1:13; Ibn Hisha-m 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 1:207; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:878

[647] Wa-qidi 1:198, 2:553, 564, 769, 3:883; Ibn Hisha-m 4:15, 272; Ibn Sa’d 2:24, 63, 92; Tabari 3:108, 126; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:427, 3:1184; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 90

[648] Ibn Hisha-m 2:241; Ibn Khayya-t 1:29; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1090, 4:1473

[649] Wa-qidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hisha-m 2:278; Ibn al-Atheer, Usd al-Gha-bah 2:291

[650] Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 54, 82,165); Muslim (al-Fadha-‘il 48); Ibn Ma-jah (al-Jiha-d 9); Tirmidhi (al-Jiha-d 15); Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr: 1644; Kala-‘i 1:101

[651] Wa-qidi 2:541; Ibn Hisha-m 3:296; Tabari 2:598; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:84; Dhahabi, Ta-rikh al-Isla-m 1:267

[652] Wa-qidi 2:757; Ibn Hisha-m 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:92; Kala-‘i 1:135

[653] Zuhri: 150; Ibn Hisha-m 4:291; Ibn Sa’d 2:136; Ibn Atheer 1:65. It should be noted that Tabarsi has narrated from Imam al-Sa-diq (‘a) that the Prophet (s) first appointed Ja’far ibn Abi Ta-lib as the commander and then, if he was martyred, Zayd ibn Ha-ritha and finally ‘Abdullah ibn Rawa-ha (Refer to A’la-m al-Wara-: 62) (Tr.)

[654] In the month of Safar, 11 A.H. (during the last days of the Prophet’s life), the Holy Prophet (s) prepared an army in order to avenge the blood of the martyrs of the Battle of Muta and appointed Usa-ma bin Zayd, whose father had been killed in the said battle, as the commander. Usama was a young man of 18 or 19 years and all the older and more experienced companions, aside from ‘Abba-s (the uncle of the Prophet) and ‘Ali ibn Abi Ta-lib, were placed under his command. When the army was about to leave, some of the older companions voiced their discontentment about the fact that their commander was a young lad. ‘Umar ibn Khatta-b took this message to the Prophet (s) who in turn expressed his intense displeasure. Despite his sickness, the Prophet (s) put one hand on ‘Ali’s shoulder and one hand on the shoulder of ‘Abba-s and came to the Masjid where he delivered a fiery sermon in which he cursed those who opposed the army of Usa-ma. The army was stationed outside Madina when the news of the Prophet’s demise came and when Abu Bakr took over the Caliphate, he sent the army to fight against the Romans. (See: Wa-qidi 3:1117; Ibn Sa’d 2:190; Ibn Atheer 2:317) (Tr.)

[655] Zuhri: 150; Wa-qidi 2:769; Ibn Hisha-m 4:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:94; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1184; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:157

[656] In the 8th year of Hijra, the Prophet (s) received information that a group of disbelievers had gathered at Dha-t al-Sala-sil behind Wa-di al-Qura- with the intention of launching a night raid on the Muslims. The Prophet (s) initially sent ‘Amr ibn ‘Aa-s with an army to fight against them but he returned unsuccessful and expressed his fear to the Prophet (s). Immediately, the Prophet (s) sent ‘Ali (‘a) to the same place and after their rejection of his invitation to accept Isla-m, he fought against them and even took some booty back as he returned to Madina victorious (See: Shaykh Mufid, al-Irsha-d: 51) (Tr.)

[657] Wa-qidi 1:34; Ibn Sa’d 2:35; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4:1682; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:39; Harawi: 99

[658] In Muharram of the fourth year of Hijra, the Holy Prophet (s) sent Abi Salamah ibn ‘Abd al-Asad in order to fight the tribe of Bani Asad. Great companions like Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarra-h, Arqam ibn Abi Arqam and Abu Qata-da ibn Nu’ma-n were present in his army. (Wa-qidi 1:343-345) (Tr.)

[659] Bukha-ri (al-Adab 27); Muslim (al-Birr 66)

[660] Zuhri: 77; Wa-qidi 1:219; Ibn Hisha-m 3:68, 305; Kala-‘i 1:24; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:59

[661] Wa-qidi 2:415; Ibn Hisha-m 3:303; Ibn Sa’d 2:46; Tabari 2:605; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:95

[662] ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay was the leader of the Hypocrites of Yathrib. When the Prophet (s) migrated there, his plans to take over the leadership of the city were thwarted, and for this reason he held a deep rooted hatred for Isla-m and the Muha-jirin, but because he had no other option, he openly professed his belief in Isla-m. He was always on the lookout for opportunities to weaken the Muslims and bring about differences among them. In the Battle of Uhud, he was instrumental in turning back three hundred soldiers. He never participated in any battles and when he did, he would weaken the spirits of the Muslims. In the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq, when the Muslims returned victorious, a misunderstanding came about between a Muha-jir and an Ansa-r. The servant of ‘Umar ibn Khatta-b and a man from the Ansa-r were quarrelling about who should take water out of a well. The disagreement was about to turn violent. ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay took this opportunity to start spreading hatred for the Muha-jirin among the Ansa-r. When the Prophet (s) heard about this, he called ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay but the latter denied what he had done. Some of the companions sought permission from the Prophet (s) to kill Ibn Ubay for what he had done but the Prophet (s) did not allow them to do this. (Wa-qidi 2:415) (Tr.)

[663] Wa-qidi 2:506; Ibn Hisha-m 3:247; Ibn Sa’d 2:54; Tabari 2:546; Kala-‘i 1:117; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:70. In the Battle against the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (s) sent a companion called Abu Luba-ba to the Jews in order to get them to surrender, but when Abu Luba-ba met the chiefs of the Jews, he was affected by the sounds of weeping from their women and children and thus made a sign with his hand towards his neck meaning that ‘if you surrender you will be killed’. When Abu Luba-ba left the Bani Quraydha, he realized his mistake and felt remorse for his treachery against the Prophet (s), so he made a vow and tied himself to one of the pillars of the Masjid of the Prophet (s) and began praying to Alla-h for forgiveness. Early in the morning the Prophet (s) came to Abu Luba-ba and untied him from the pillar saying that Alla-h had forgiven him. Henceforth this pillar was known as the pillar of Abu Luba-ba. (Tr.)

[664] Bukha-ri (al-Magha-zi 2:46); Muslim (Fadha-‘il al-Saha-ba 161). Hatab bin Abi Balta’ah was one of the Muha-jirs who, because the weakness of his faith, acted treacherously. Before the Conquest of Makkah, he secretly sent a letter to some of the heads of the Quraysh to inform them about the intention of the Holy Prophet (s) to conquer Makkah. No sooner had he sent the letter that Jibra’il descended to the Prophet (s) and informed him of this. The Prophet (s) sent Imam ‘Ali (‘a) to stop the messenger and take the letter. Then the Prophet (s) called Hatab and sought to know his reason for doing this. Ibn Abi Balta’ah said that he was still a Muslim and had not given up his faith, but it was only because of his fear for his family who were in Makkah that he did what he had done. When the companions heard this they sought permission from the Prophet (s) to kill him but the Prophet refused and spared his life. (Tr.)

[665] Zuhri: 150; Ibn Hisha-m 4:272; Ibn ‘Asa-kir 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:157; Ibn Hajar 5:3

[666] The Holy Prophet (s) was sent to guide a people who were living in the depths of ignorance. People would fight wars in order to gain booty and gain possession over the other’s property, as well as to show their valor or secure their ‘honor’. The Prophet (s) came to these people as an exemplary role model, with perfect morals and an infallible character. But some people were not able to do away with their old habits and we see, for example, in the Battle of Uhud, that the archers who were commanded not to leave their post disobeyed the direct order of the Prophet (s) just so that they could get a portion of the war booty. Another example is what took place after the Battle of Hunayn when the Ansa-r were given a lesser portion of the booty they began to protest. When the Prophet (s) got angry and explained the reason for this allotment, the Ansa-r began to cry and said that they do not wish for anything more than the Prophet’s pleasure with them. (Tr.)

[667] Bukha-ri (Magha-zi 56); Muslim (al-Zaka-h 139); Tirmidhi (al-Zaka-h 29); Nasa-‘i (al-Zaka-h 79)

[668] Zuhri: 77; Wa-qidi 2:415; Ibn Hisha-m 4:47; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Qayyim 2:444

[669] Ibn Hanbal 3:67; Bukha-ri (al-Ahka-m 4); Majmu’ah min al-Mu’allifeen al-‘Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu’ah al-‘Askariyya 1:131

[670] Q4:136; Q24:62; Q48:9,13; Q49:15; Q61:11; Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 4); Abu Da-wud (al-Ashribah 7); Tirmidhi (Fadha-‘il al-Jiha-d 230)

[671] Zuhri: 52; Wa-qidi 2:760; Kala-‘i 1:127

[672] Q7:157; Q48:9; Bukha-ri (al-Eima-n 8, Magha-zi 53); Muslim (al-Eima-n 69); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 14)

[673] Q2:285; Q3:32, 172; Q4:13, 59, 69, 80; Q5:7; Q8:1; Q24:51, 54; Q64:16; Bukha-ri (al-Ahka-m 4, al-Jiha-d 109); Muslim 3:1391; Nasa-‘i (al-Bay’ah 5)

[674] Q3:172; Q13:18; Q42:38; Muslim 3:1433

[675] Q9:59; Ibn Hanbal 2:310; Muslim (al-Masa-jid 279, al-Sala-h 13, al-Fadha-‘il 63); Ibn Ma-jah (al-Iqa-mah 147); Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d 118); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 57)

[676] Ibn Sa’d 2:2-5, 24, 35, 56, 61

[677] Wa-qidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hisha-m 3:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:36, 39; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4:1449; Ibn ‘Asa-kir 1:92; Ibn al-Atheer 4:344

[678] See examples of this in Wa-qidi 2:552, 506; Ibn Sa’d 2:62, 122; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:105, 108; Ibn al-Hajar, al-Isa-bah 1L98, 4:11, 176

[679] Wa-qidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hisha-m 4:21; Tabari 2:512; Kala-‘i :136

[680] Zuhri: 52; Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 82); Muslim 4:1804

[681] Q2:153; Q3:31; Q33:21; Shayba-ni 1:118; Tabari 3:75

[682] See how the army took sensible measures to choose a new commander after the martyrdom of three commanders in the Battle of Muta in al-Magha-zi 2:756, 763; Ibn Hisha-m 4:21; Ibn Sa’d 2:94

[683] Zuhri: 150; Wa-qidi 2:769; Ibn Hisha-m 4:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:94; Tabari 3:31

[684] Q3:172; Wa-qidi 1:335; Ibn Sa’d 2:34; Kala-‘i 1:105

[685] Zuhri: 55; Ibn Hisha-m 3:327; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Ibn al-Atheer 2:204. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya there were numerous conditions that seemed unfair to the Muslims and for this reason many companions voiced protests against the signing of this treaty but at the same time, they submitted to the will of the supreme commander and had to accept the treaty in the end. (Tr.)

[686] Wa-qidi 2:760; Ibn Hisha-m 4:17; Tabari 3:37

[687] Ibn Hisha-m 3:71; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kala-‘i 1:102, 103

[688] Wa-qidi 1:9; Ibn Hisha-m 2:245; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Tabari 2:402; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:224

[689] Ibn Hisha-m 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:224

[690] Wa-qidi 1:152; Ibn Sa’d 2:6; Tabari 2:431; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr: 121

[691] The first battle was the Battle of Wadda-n which took place in the month of Safar, 2 A.H. against the Bani Khumra and Quraysh, after which a peace treaty was signed. The last battle was the Battle of Tabuk against the Romans, where the forces numbered thirty thousand and ten thousand on horseback. (Tr.)

[692] Wa-qidi 1:10 – 13; Ibn Hisha-m 2:241, 251; Ibn Sa’d 2:1-5; Tabari: 259

[693] Wa-qidi 1:48; Ibn Hisha-m 2:266; Ibn Sa’d 2:8; Tabari 2:434; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:247

[694] Wa-qidi 2:800, 812, 819

[695] Wa-qidi 1:218, 2:685; Tabari 3:77; Suhayli 4:37; Kala-‘i 1:145

[696] Wa-qidi 1:45, 300, 2:495, 705, 723, 741, 825, 3:922, 938; Ibn Hisha-m 3:357, 4:129; Ibn Sa’d 2:36, 61, 89, 92

[697] It should be noted that Bi’r Ma’unah and al-Rajee’ were not battles or military missions, rather they were unarmed missions sent for propagation of the faith who were attacked and killed by the enemies. (Tr.)

[698] Ibn Hisha-m 4:205-245; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283 onwards

[699] Wa-qidi 2:670; Ibn Hisha-m 3:344, 347; Ibn Sa’d 2:502

[700] Ibn Sa’d 2:21

[701] Wa-qidi 1:194

[702] Wa-qidi 2:454, 800; Ibn Hisha-m 3:231, 4:23, 63; Ibn Sa’d 2:47; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:215

[703] The issue of economizing on forces is something that is given importance and taken into consideration even today (Tr.)

[704] Wa-qidi 1:220, 2:800 onwards; Dhahabi 1:267

[705] Ibn Hisha-m 4:85; Ibn Sa’d 1:44, 77, 109; Tabari 3:9; Ya-qut Himyari 2:487; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:193

[706] Zuhri: 76, 84; Wa-qidi 1:199, 2:440, 633; Ibn Hisha-m 3:64, 224, 342; Ibn Sa’d 2:25, 47, 77; Ibn Khayya-t 1:29; Kala-‘i 1:104, 114, 130

[707] Wa-qidi 2:800, 812, 819; Ibn Hisha-m 4:42

[708] Wa-qidi 2:800 onwards; Ibn Hisha-m 4:42

[709] Ibn Hisha-m 3:96 onwards; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kala-‘i 1:102

[710] Wa-qidi 3:895 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:108; Suhayli 4:96

[711] Wa-qidi 2:802; Ibn Hisha-m 4:94; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Ibn Hazm: 231

[712] Wa-qidi 2:800, 812

[713] Majmu’ah al-Ta’leef fi Akadimiyya Farunzi al-‘Askariyya – al-Takteek: 464

[714] Wa-qidi 2:800, 812 onwards

[715] Wa-qidi 2:820; Ibn Hisha-m 4:41

[716] Zuhri: 50; Wa-qidi 2:643; Ibn Hisha-m 2:266, 272; Qurtubi 2:1493; Ibn Katheer 3:262, 267

[717] Wa-qidi 1:53; Ibn Hisha-m 2:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:9; Tabari 2:440; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1:316

[718] Wa-qidi 1:209 onwards; Ibn Hisha-m 3:67; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Tabari 2:503

[719] Wa-qidi 2:445, 478; Ibn Hisha-m 3:234; Ibn Sa’d 2:47, 53; Tabari 2:566, 573; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:594, 601, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283

[720] Wa-qidi 2:580; Tirmidhi (al-Jiha-d 34)

[721] Wa-qidi 2:644

[722] Wa-qidi 3:1019

[723] Wa-qidi 2:760; Ibn Hisha-m 4:17; Ibn Sa’d 2:93; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375

[724] Zuhri: 50; Wa-qidi 2:580, 643, 3:1019; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375

[725] Wa-qidi 1:209; Ibn Hisha-m 3:67; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Tabari 2:503; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:4

[726] Ibn Hisha-m 2:67; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Ibn al-Atheer 2:150; The youth were enthusiastic about leaving Madina and they felt that if they remained behind and fought defensively, the enemy would become bolder and would take them as cowards. For this reason they insisted that the army go out of Madina, and the Prophet (s) agreed to this even though it was against his own opinion. In the end, the Muslims suffered a defeat in this battle. (Tr.)

[727] Ibn Hanbal 2:231; Muslim (al-Jannah 64); Ibn Ma-jah (al-At’imah 6, 30); Abu Da-wud (al-At’imah 17); Tirmidhi (al-Jumu’ah 43); al-Nasa-‘i (al-Istisqa-‘ 3)

[728] Da-rimi (al-Muqaddima 34); Ibn Ma-jah (al-Fitan 71); Abu Da-wud (al-Mala-him 17)

[729] Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1:316; 2:594, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 1:364, 2:283, 338

[730] Ibn Hanbal 5:230; Da-rimi (al-Ru’ya- 13); Bukha-ri (al-Muna-fiqun 10); Abu Da-wud (al-Aqdhiya 11); Tirmidhi (al-Ahka-m 3); al-Nasa-‘i (al-Hajj 49)

[731] Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 195); Muslim (al-Fadha-‘il 140, al-Sala-h 178); Abu Da-wud (al-Sunnah 12) al-Nasa-‘i (al-Qudha-t 11)

[732] Da-rimi (al-Ru’ya- 13); Bukha-ri (al-I’tisa-m 28); Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d 37)

[733] Q33:36; Wa-qidi 1:53 onwards; Nasa-‘i (al-Ashriba 36)

[734] Q3:159; Ibn Hanbal 1:30, 3:105, 4:10; Bukha-ri: 79; Abu Da-wud (a;-Adab 88); Harawi: 73

[735] Ibn Hanbal 3:729; Bukha-ri (al-Hudud 71, al-Muha-ribun 16); Abu Da-wud (al-Adab 114); al-Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 6)

[736] Wa-qidi 1:53, 209, 2:445, 478, 760; Ibn Hisha-m 2:272, 3:67, 4:17; Abu Da-wud (al-Buyu’ 5); Harawi: 74

[737] Ibn Sa’d 2:9, 26, 47, 53, 93; Tabari 2:440, 503, 566, 3:37; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:63 onwards; Harawi: 74

[738] Wa-qidi 1:53; Ibn Hisha-m 3:234; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Tabari 2:566, 573

[739] Q42:38; Ibn Hanbal 1:48; Muslim (al-Masa-jid 78); Abu Da-wud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 78)

[740] Tirmidhi (al-Mana-qib 37); Bukha-ri (al-‘Ilm 2); Muslim (al-Ima-rah 22)

[741] Bukha-ri (al-Ahka-m 42, al-I’tisa-m 28); Nasa-‘i (al-Bay’ah 32); Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:32 onwards

[742] Ibn Hanbal 5:274; Bukha-ri (al-I’tisa-m 28); Abu Da-wud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39, al-Adab 57)

[743] ‘Umar ibn al-Khatta-b would constantly seek advice from the close companions of the Holy Prophet (s) like ‘Ali ibn Abi Ta-lib (‘a). In more than one occasion, the Muslim army achieved victory because of this advice. (Tr.)

[744] Q8:65; Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 110); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 30)

[745] Q4:84; Bukha-ri (al-Magha-zi 17); Muslim (al-Ima-rah 117); Nasa-‘I (al-Zaka-h 85; al-Buyu’ 98)

[746] Q6:19, Q17:106, Q18:54, Q73:20, Q96:1; Wa-qidi 1:347, 3:1057; Ibn Hisha-m 3:178; Ibn Sa’d 2:36, 39

[747] Examples of this was when the committee was discussing whether to leave Madina in the Battle of Uhud and during the digging of the trench in the Battle of Khandaq (see: Ibn Hisha-m 2:226)

[748] Da-rimi (al-Jiha-d 18); Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d 25); Tirmidhi (Fadha-‘il al-Jiha-d 13); Nasa-‘i (al-Qisa-mah 18)

[749] Bukha-ri (al-Nika-h 71, 72); Muslim (al-Nika-h 98, 101, al-‘Eid 19); Nasa-‘i (al-‘Eida-n 36)

[750] Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 82); Muslim 3:1401, 802; Tirmidhi (al-Jiha-d 15)

[751] Q8:41; Zuhri: 93; Wa-qidi 1:96, 407, 2:535, 3:943; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 95, 120

[752] Wa-qidi 1:78, 377, 2:540, 648; Ibn Hisha-m 4:122; Ibn Sa’d 2:174; Tabari 3:73

[753] Muslim (al-Ima-rah 139); Ibn Ma-jah (al-Nika-h 36, 53); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 47)

[754] Shayba-ni 1:58; Ibn Hisha-m 2:245, 278; Tabari 2:181

[755] Ibn Hisha-m 3:71; Ibn Sa’d 2:61; Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 80)

[756] Da-rimi (al-Siyar 53); Muslim (al-Jiha-d 150); Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d 142)

[757] Wa-qidi 1:338, 2:729, 803; Ibn Hisha-m 3:304; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2: 167

[758] Look at how the Prophet (s) wanted to keep the information about the breaking of the pact by the Bani Quraydha confidential and also told Habba-b ibn Mundhir not to let anyone know about the number of enemy forces in the Battle of Uhud (Wa-qidi 1:207)

[759] Ibn Hanbal 5:321; Bukha-ri (al-Ahka-m 4); Nasa-‘i (al-Bay’ah 5)

[760] Bukha-ri (al-Eima-n 8, al-Magha-zi 53); Muslim (al-Eima-n 69); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 14)

[761] Wa-qidi 1:258; Ibn Hisha-m 2:280, 3:39; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 1:257

[762] Wa-qidi 1:21, 88; Ibn Hisha-m 3:70; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:6

[763] Wa-qidi 1:152, 2:457, 755; Ibn Hisha-m 3:231; Ibn Sa’d 2:47; Tabari 2:431

[764] Ibn Hisha-m 4:19-21; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Qayyim 2:375

[765] Wa-qidi 1:173, 184, 391; Ibn Hisha-m 3:54, 287; Ibn Sa’d 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 184, 198

[766] Q8:65, Q9:19, 20, 41, 89; Bukha-ri (al-Magha-zi 53, al-Jiha-d 110); Tirmidhi (al-Eima-n 8, Fadha-‘il al-Jiha-d 22); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 18)

[767] Q2:154, Q3:169, Q4:73; Bukha-ri (Fadha-‘il al-Saha-bah 5); Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 19, al-Bay’ah 37)

[768] Q9:52; Ibn Hanbal 3:483; Nasa-‘i (al-Jiha-d 19, al-Buyu’ 98)

[769] Wa-qidi 1:212

[770] Ibn Is’ha-q: 309; Wa-qidi 1:208; Ibn Hisha-m 3:88; Tabari: 517; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1:108; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:12; the brother of Anas bin Ma-lik would cry out: life after the death of the Holy Prophet (s) has no value for us (Tr.)

[771] Wa-qidi 1:69, 112, 257; Ibn Hisha-m 3:305; Ibn Sa’d 2:10, 46

[772] Wa-qidi 1:360; Ibn Hisha-m 3:185; Tabari 2:541; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:440; Khubayb was one of the teachers of the Qur’a-n who was martyred in the tragedy of ‘al-Rajee’. The polytheists tried to force him to turn away from Isla-m before killing him when they were unable to do so (Tr.)

[773] Zuhri: 79; Wa-qidi 2:353, 563, 729; Ibn Hisha-m 3:292; Tabari 2:554

[774] Ibn Hisha-m 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 30); Nasa-‘i (al-Mana-sik 84); in today’s terminology this is known as ‘psychological warfare’ and it is carried out to weaken the spirits of the enemy’s army (Tr.)

[775] Wa-qidi 1:203, 338; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1473

[776] Wa-qidi 1:99; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4:1473

[777] Wa-qidi 1:404, 2:550, 640, 802; Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d: Ba’th al-‘Uyun 84)

[778] Wa-qidi 1:395, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hisha-m 3:244, 342; Ibn Sa’d 2:53, 77; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:39, 105 onwards

[779] Wa-qidi: 535; Ibn Hisha-m 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Na-s 2:109

[780] Wa-qidi 1:12, 2:537; Ibn Hisha-m 2:315, 3:293; Ibn Asad 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Kala-‘i 1:123

[781] Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukha-ri (al-Jiha-d 110); Abu Da-wud (al-Jiha-d 24)

[782] Shayba-ni 1:118; Wa-qidi 1:207; Tabari 3:75; Kala-‘i 1:144

[783] Zuhri: 79; Muslim 3:1361

[784] Zuhri: 79; Wa-qidi 1:337 onwards and 2:440; Ibn Hisha-m 3:129 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:36, 47; Tabari 3:29, 565; Kala’i 1:104, 114; Watt: 57


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